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Contractual Discretion and the
Endangered Species Act: Can the
Bureau of Reclamation Reallocate
Federal Project Water for Endangered
Species in the Middle Rio Grande?
ABSTRACT
The San Juan-Chama Project provides water to municipalities and
irrigation interests in the Middle Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico
under contracts entered into with the Bureau of Reclamation.
Interests representing an endangered fish are now asserting claims
for a share of this water. This article addresses the question of
whether the terms of the San Juan-Chama contracts provide the
Bureau of Reclamation the authority to reallocate contracted San
Juan-Chama water for the Rio Grande silvery minnow in light of
that agency's obligations under the Endangered Species Act. The
article examines the terms of the contracts themselves and concludes
that contract language can be construed to provide sufficient
authority for reallocation of project water. This conclusion is
strengthened if the Endangered Species Act is held to amend the
project's authorizing statutes and the contracts. The Ninth Circuit
case law supporting this conclusion is examined in the context of
the Middle Rio Grande. The implications of the fractured Winstar
opinions on the application of the unmistakable-terms canon of
government contract construction are also analyzed. If parties sue
to enjoin the government from reallocating water to the silvery
minnow and the Ninth Circuit reasoning is adopted, the
Endangered Species Act will be held to amend the contracts and
permit reallocation. If not, the parties will likely be ajfrded
damages f the government elects to reallocate water for the
minnow.
1. INTRODUCTION
The issue of water for people versus water for endangered fish has
come to a head in the Middle Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico, as it has
* A portion of the research for this article was performed when the author was a law
clerk in the offices of Sheehan. Sheehan, and Stelzm, P.A., representing the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District. The author wishes to thank Professor G. Emlen Hall Professor
Suedeen G. Kelley, John Utton, Esq., and J. Brian Smith, Fsq., for their support and
encouragement.
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and will elsewhere in the arid West. The Bureau of Reclamation has
asserted that it lacks the discretion under repayment contracts with users
in the Middle Rio Grande to reallocate contracted federal project water for
preservation of an endangered fish, the Rio Grande silvery minnow. The
Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) constructed the San Juan-Chama Project to
divert and transport water from the Upper Colorado Basin to New Mexico.
The City of Albuquerque (the City) and the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District (MRGCD), the primary irrigation district in the
Middle Rio Grande Valley, are major contractors for this federal project
water. The City agrees with the BOR that the agency lacks discretion to
reallocate water for the minnow and recently filed suit in Federal District
Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.' Other pending lawsuits
also raise the question of the BOR's discretion and duty to reallocate San
Juan-Chama contracted water for the silvery minnow.2
This article analyses one question embedded within the discretion
issue: What authority to reallocate contracted Sanjuan-Chama water for the
silvery minnow do the terms of the repayment contracts provide to the BOR
in light of that agency's obligations under the Endangered Species Act?3
One line of argument concludes that the BOR does have the contractual
discretion to reallocate San Juan-Chama water for the minnow because the
terms of the repayment contracts themselves provide the BOR the authority
to reallocate project water for fish and wildlife purposes and in times of
"shortage." This argument is further bolstered by the Ninth Circuit's
holdings in a line of similar cases from the Central Valley of California. The
Ninth Circuit held that the Endangered Species Act amends and
supplements reclamation law and contracts and thus the requirement to
1. See City of Albuquerque v. United States ex rel. Babbitt, No. CIV 99-00985 (D.N.M.
filed June 22, 2000).
2. See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez, No. CIV 99-01320 (D.N.M. filed Nov.
15,1999). Due to a change in administrations, the case is now named Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
v. McDonald; however, the case number remains the same.
3. Other questions embedded within the discretion issue include whether reallocation
for endangered species would violate the authorizing statutes and interstate compacts that
require project water to be used for beneficial and consumptive uses within New Mexico. See
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. Il, ch. 48,63 Stat. 31 (1949) (current version at 43
U.S.C. § 6200 (1994)); Colorado River Storage Project Act, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (1956) (current
version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620o (1994)); San Juan-Chama Project Act, Pub. L No. 87-483, 76
Sat. 96 (1962) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 620a (1994)). Another issue is whether the
government's reallocation of federal project water forendangered species purposes constitutes
a Fifth Amendment taking. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin WaterStorage Dist. v. United States, No.
98-101 L, 2001 US. Claims LEXIS 72 (Fed. CL Apr. 30, 2001) (holding that the government's
reallocation of contracted federal project water for endangered species was a physical taking).
These issues are outside the scope of this artice and will not be substantively addressed.
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conserve endangered species under the Act overrides the rights of the water
users under their contracts for federal project water.4
A contrasting line of argument concludes that the fish and wildlife
purposes included in the San Juan-Chama Project's authorizing language
and in the contracts themselves are incidental to the primary purposes of
water supply for irrigation and municipal needs and therefore cannot
override those principal purposes. This argument may be further bolstered
by United States v. Winstar Corp., a U.S. Supreme Court case that limits the
application of the heretofore well settled doctrine that subsequent acts of
Congress, such as the Endangered Species Act, govern preexisting
government contracts, such as the San Juan-Chama contracts, unless
sovereign power has been surrendered in unmistakable terms.' If this
unmistakable terms doctrine does not apply to the San Juan-Chama
contracts, then the Endangered Species Act does not amend or supplement
the contracts and the San Juan-Chama water users may have a basis for
breach of contract or Fifth Amendment takings claims if San Juan-Chama
water is reallocated to endangered species needs and is not available to
irrigators and municipalities under the delivery terms of the contracts.
If the unmistakable terms doctrine does apply to the San Juan-
Chama contracts, the contractors may have no legal basis to enjoin the
government from reallocating water for the minnow. Indeed, the BOR may
then have an overriding obligation under the Endangered Species Act to
reallocate water as a Reasonable and Prudent Alternative to conserve and
avoid jeopardizing the continued existence of the species.' However, the
contractors may then have a cause of action for monetary compensation for
the contracted water they did not receive.
This article examines both of these lines of argument. First, the
context of the Middle Rio Grande is explained, with emphasis on the San
Juan-Chama Project, the endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow, and the
recent and pending lawsuits. The San Juan-Chama repayment contracts are
then described, with emphasis on the contracts' specific language that may
be interpreted as providing discretion for reallocation of water for fish and
wildlife purposes. The issue of fish and wildlife as an incidental purpose
versus irrigation and municipal supply as the principal purpose is explored
in this section. The article then turns to the mandate of the Endangered
Species Act and the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of similar BOR contracts,
4. See, for example, O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 1995); Klamath
Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206,1209 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub
nora. Klamath Drainage Dist. v. Patterson, 121 S. CL 44 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by 203 F3d 1175
(9th Cir. 2000). Both O'Neill and KLamath are discussed further in the article.
5. 518 U.S. 839 (1996). See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982);
Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
6. See infra Part 1I.B.2.
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which concludes that the ESA amends and supplements reclamation law
and contracts and therefore provides sufficient authority for the BOR to
reallocate water for endangered species purposes. The contrasting
argument is also explored, with emphasis on whether the government
surrendered its sovereign power to amend the San Juan-Chama contracts
by subsequent acts of Congress in unmistakable terms under the recent
redirection by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Winstar Corp. The
article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these issues for
decision making and the course of litigation in the Middle Rio Grande and
elsewhere in the arid West.
II. THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE CONTEXT
The Middle Rio Grande Valley, like many regions in the arid West,
has seen increased urban growth overlaid on a predominantly rural and
irrigation-dependent agricultural economic base.' This juxtaposition has
resulted in tremendous pressure on water supplies in the Middle Rio
Grande Valley. The Rio Grande is the only source of surface water in the
valley, and it is fully appropriated. Pumping groundwater to support urban
demand is becoming increasingly impractical as the limitations of the
supply and the deleterious effects of prolonged groundwater pumping
become evident." The City of Albuquerque (the City) and the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD) had the foresight in the mid-
twentieth century to pursue the San Juan-Chama Project authorization and
construction to divert water from the Upper Colorado River Basin for
storage and release into the Rio Grande to augment native surface water
supplies in New Mexico.
With the listing of the silvery minnow as an endangered species
dependent on river flows, this imported water has become the subject of
lawsuits involving environmental groups, the City, the MRGCD, the State
of New Mexico, and the BOR and the Department of the Interior. It is
within the context of these lawsuits that the issue of the government's
discretion to release water for endangered species will likely be decided.
7. See generally ATLAS OP THE NEW WEST. PORIRAIT OF A CHANGING REGiON (William E.
Riebsame ed., 1997); Pamela Case & Gregory Alward, Patterns of Demographic, Economic, and
Value Change in the Western United States: Implications for Water Use and Management, REFORTTO
THE WESTERN WATER Poucy ADVISORY REVIEW COMMISSION, August 1997.
8. See PuB. WORKS DE'T, CrIYOpALBUQUERQUE,N.M.,WATERRESOURCES MANAGEMENT
STRATEGY 21 (Apr. 24, 1997), available at http://www.cabq.gov/waterresources/
strategytexLhtml; 1 PUB. WORKS DEP'T, CrIY OF ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., ALBUQUERQUE WATER
REsOURCESMANAGEMENTSTRATEGY: SANJUAN-CHAMA DvERsION PROijEcTOPToN§ 1.2 (1995)
[hereinafter SAN JUAN-CHAMA Dm ION PROJEcT OPrIoNs].
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The following sections provide an overview of the current situation in the
Middle Rio Grande and how the discretion issue has been framed there.
A. The San Juan-Chama Project
The San Juan-Chama Project is a transmountain water diversion
project that imports Colorado River water into the Rio Grande." The San
Juan-Chama water is diverted through 26 miles of tunnels in southern
Colorado and northern New Mexico and is stored at Heron Reservoir prior
to release to downstream contracted water users in the Middle Rio Grande
Valley of New Mexico. The BOR constructed and operates Heron
Reservoir."0 The BOR entered into repayment contracts with several Middle
Rio Grande water users, most notably the City of Albuquerque and the
MRGCD, for supply of this water in accordance with the authorizing
statutes and the terms of the contracts."
This federal project water is important to the municipalities and
irrigators within the Middle Rio Grande Valley. The City and the MRGCD
are the two primary contractors for San Juan-Chama water, together
accounting for about 70 percent of the project's firm yield." San Juan-
9. For a fuller description of the San Juan-Chama Project, see I SANJUAN-CHAMA
DIVERSION PROJECT OPTIONS, supra note 8, at 1-5 to 1-7.
10. Heron Reservoir was constructed in the 1960s pursuant to the Sanjuan-Chama Project
Act, Pub. L No. 87-483, 76 Stat. 96 (1962) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 620a (1994)), which
amended the Colorado River Storage Project Act, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (1956) (current version
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620o (1994)).
11. The City and the MRGCD entered into contracts with the BOR to pay to the
government a share of project construction costs and annual operations and maintenance costs.
In return, BOR agreed to construct, operate, and maintain the project works, and to deliver
annually to the contractors their specified percent shares of available project water. See
Contract between the United States of America Department of the Interior Bureau of
Reclamation and the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Furnishing a Municipal Water
Supply, Contract No. 14-06-500-810, June 25, 1963 [hereinafter City Contract) (on file with
author); Amendatory Contract between the United States of America and the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District, New Mexico, Contract No. 178r-423 Amendment No. 4, June 25,
1963 [hereinafter MRGCD Contract] (on file with author) (both contracts are discussed more
fully in section I). The contracts were entered into pursuant to reclamation law, including the
Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093,32 Stat. 388 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 43 U.S.C.). Other contractors include several local municipalities and counties. These are
repayment contracts under section 9(d) of the Reclamation Act of 1939, 43 U.S.C. § 485h(d)
(1994), as opposed to water service contracts under section 9(e), in which the contractor only
pays a set annual amount in return for a specified amount of water.
12. SeeCity Contract, supra note 11, art. 7a (the City's original share was 52.27%); MRGCD
Contract, supra note 11, art. 7a (the MRGCD's share is 20.55%). The City's contract was
amended in 1965 to reduce the City's annual share by 5,000 acre-feet, bringing the City's total
allocation to 48,200 acre-feet per year or 47.35% of the project's firm yield. See 3 SAN JUAN-
CHAMA DIVERSION PROJECT OPTIONS, supra note 8, at § D.3.A.
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Chana water figures prominently in the City's recently adopted water
strategy for future development. 3 The new plan's central feature is the
replacement of current groundwater pumping with direct use of San Juan-
Chama water.4 The City therefore feels strongly protective of its contract
rights to San Juan-Chama water. It is also important for the irrigators of the
MRGCD, although native Rio Grande water is also an important source of
irrigation water.
The San Juan-ChamaProject was authorized by the Colorado River
Storage Project Act"5 and the San Juan Chama Project Act. 6 The Colorado
River Storage Project Act was enacted with the following purposes:
to initiate the comprehensive development of the water
resources of the Upper Colorado River Basin, for the
purposes, among others, of regulating the flow of the
Colorado River, storing water for beneficial consumptive use,
making it possible for the States of the Upper Basin to utilize,
consistently with the provisions of the Colorado River
Compact, the apportionments made to and among them in
the Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact, respectively, providing for reclamation of
arid and semiarid land, for the control of floods, and for the
generation of hydroelectric power, as an incident of the
foregoing purposes, the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized.. .(2) to construct, operate, and maintain the.. .San
Juan-Chama [Project]..."7
The San Juan-Chama Project Act later authorized construction of
the initial phase of the project, with the following purposes:
for the principle purposes of furnishing water supplies to
approximately thirty-nine thousand three hundred acres of
land in the Cerro, Taos, Llano and Pojoaque tributary
irrigation units in the Rio Grande Basin and approximately
eighty-one thousand six hundred acres of land in the existing
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District and for municipal,
domestic and industrial uses, and providing recreation and
fish and wildlife benefits. 8
13. See 3 SAN JUAN-CHAbMA DIVERSION PROJECTOrIONS, supra note 8, at § D.3.
14. See id. The City currently uses the San Juan-Chama water to offset river depletions
resulting from groundwater pumping,
15. Ch. 203,70 Stat. 105.
16. Pub. L. No. 87-483,76 Stat. 96 (1962) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 620a (1994)).
17. 70 Stat. 105.
18. § 8,76 Stat 96. These statements of purpose have been examined closely in the wake
of listing of the Rio Grande silvery minnow as an endangered species. See Final Rule to List the
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow as an Endangered Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 36988 (July 20, 1994)
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The San Juan-Chama authorizing language was construed with
respect to the project goals and limitations discussed inicarilla Apache Tnbe
v. United States.19 In Jicarilla, the City proposed to store San Juan-Chama
project water in downstream Elephant Butte Reservoir for a variety of
purposes, including eventual resale, electrical power, and recreation, such
as boating and fishing." The City argued at that time that each of these uses
was authorized by the San Juan-Chama Project Act.21 The Tenth Circuit
called into question the proposition that storage for recreation is a beneficial
use under state law, but did not rule on that issue. Instead, the court
concluded that storage for recreational purposes "would be at odds with
the federal statutes authorizing the San Juan-Chama project."2
The court examined the Colorado River Storage Project Act and the
San Juan-Chama Project Act, and from the later act concluded that "the
principal uses of the San Juan-Chama water are to be municipal, domestic,
industrial, and irrigation. True, it expresses the intention that the water
(codified at 50 C.F.I. pt. 17 (2000)). While water supply for municipal and irrigation purposes
is undeniably included within the principal purposes of the San Juan-Cham project, at issue
is whether water for fish and wildlife benefits is a sufficiently prominent purpose to reallocate
supplies to it from contractors. One case from the Middle Rio Grande concludes that it is not
when the water would be used for recreation and fishing. Jicarilia Apache Tribe v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1126,1138 (10th Cir. 1981). A line of cases from the Ninth Circuit, addressed
more fully below, argues for a more prominent role for fish and wildlife purposes, reasoning
that the Endangered Species Act, with its huge and imperative mandate to federal agencies to
conserve endangered species, amended and supplemented reclamation law and those contracts
that arose under reclamation law. See generally O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.
1995).
19. 657 F.2d 1126.
20. Id. at 1133.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 1136-37.
23, Id. at 1137. The Tribe argued that section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 required that
state law govern the release of SanJuan.Chama water. Section 8 states that "nothing in this Act
shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to In any way interfere with the laws of
any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used
in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in
carrying out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws." 43 U.S.C.
§ 383 (1994). New Mexico state law establishes beneficial use as the "measure and limit" of a
water right N.M STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1-2, -5-22, -5-23, -5-25 (Michie 1997). The Tribe argued that
storage of water for recreational or fish and wildlife purposes is not a beneficial use recognized
explicitly by New Mexico law, though the New Mexico Attorney General has argued that there
is nothing in New Mexico law that precludes such a recognition. See Op. N.M. Atty Gen. 9801.
The Tenth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's ruling in California v. United States that "state
water law does not control in the distribution of reclamation water if inconsistent with other
congressional directives to the Secretary." 438 U.S. 645,668 n.21 (1978) (citations omitted). In
response to the Jicarilla decision, Congress passed legislation to explicitly authorize the storage
of San Juan-Chama water at Elephant Butte Reservoir for "recreational and other beneficial
purposes." Act of December 29,1981, Pub. L No. 97-140, § 5, 95 Stat. 1717.
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provide recreation and fish and wildlife benefits. It is plain, however, that
such benefits are not intended to be primary purposes, but, rather,
incidental ones."' The Jicarilla court based its decision not only on the
provisions of the authorizing statutes, but also on the "more compelling
reason for the decision not to allocate water to recreation or fish and
wildlife. Congress has been told repeatedly that there is a critical shortage
of water in the Rio Grande Basin, and that additional water is desperately
needed for municipal, industrial and agricultural purposes."' Based on this
desperate need, the court held that the San Juan-Chama project's
authorizing statutes were "deliberately intended to make recreation and
fish and wildlife benefits incidental to other primary uses of the water."'
The court was concerned that large scale allocations of San Juan-Chama
water to recreational uses proposed by the City would "leave little room for
primary uses. Recreation could not justifiably constitute the only beneficial
use of such a large amount of San Juan-Chama water." '
In contrast, the current issue in the Middle Rio Grande is not
storage for recreational boating or fishing, but provision of instream flows
desperately needed to support an endangered species. In the Endangered
Species Act, Congress emphatically laid down a clear statutory mandate to
federal agencies to conserve endangered species.' Recreation and fishing
uses had no such statutory mandate when the Tenth Circuit issued its
ruling in Jicarilla. When faced with this same issue, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Endangered Species Act amended and supplemented federal
reclamation law, and the federal mandate to conserve endangered species
overrode contractors' rights to federal project water2s
24. 657 F.2d at 1139. In 1993, the Department of Interior Regional Solicitor referred to
section 8 of the San Juan-Chama Project Act, Pub. L No. 87-483, 76 Stat 96 (1962) (current
version at 43 U.S.C. § 620a (1994)), and took an opposite view in a Solicitor's Opinion
Memorandum regarding BOR discretion to allocate water for endangered species: "this
language clearly specifies that providing fish and wildlife benefits is one of the principal
purposes of the San Juan-Chama project." Memorandum from the Intermountain Regional
Solicitor of the Bureau of Reclamation, to Upper Colorado Regional Director of the Bureau of
Reclamation, addressing Water Management for Endangered Species in the Middle Rio Grande
6 (Apr. 2,1993) (on file with author). Interestingly, the Memorandum concluded that "ample
authority exists to provide flows for the minnow," In the context of a BOR contract for water
for fish and wildlife purposes. Id. at 1, 6.
25. 657 F.2d at 1141.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (1994).
29. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 FP3 677 (9th Cir. 1995); Klanath Water Users
Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Klamath
Drainage Dist. v. Patterson, 121 S. Ct. 44 (2000), amended by 203 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2000).
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B. The Endangered Species Act and the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
1. The Requirements of the Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)' places several requirements on
federal agencies. The first is a general requirement to "conserve endangered
species" and to "utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of
this chapter"3t by "carrying out programs for the conservation of
endangered species."' In addition, under Section 7 of the ESA, federal
agencies are required to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS)? "to insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency.. .is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species.. .or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
habitat of such species which is determined.. .to be critical....'
Once a species is listed as endangered or threatened, a proposed
federal agency action' triggers a Section 7 consultation, typically with the
FWS. The action agency prepares a Biological Assessment "for the purpose
of identifying any endangered species or threatened species which is likely
tobe affected" by the proposed agency action.3 If the Biological Assessment
concludes that a proposed action may affect a listed species, formal Section
7 consultation is initiated and a Biological Opinion is requested of the
FWS ' The Biological Opinion assesses whether the proposed agency action
will jeopardize the continued existence of the listed species or result in
adverse modification of critical habitat.' If the Biological Opinion concludes
that jeopardy will occur, the FWS must suggest Reasonable and Prudent
Alternatives that can be taken by the action agency to avoid jeopardy."
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. For a fuller history and discussion of the provisions of the
Endangered Species Act and implementing regulations, see MCHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J.
ROWLAND, THE EVOLULnON OF NATIONAL WUmE LAW 193-276 (3rd ed. 1997).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1).
32. § 1536(a)(1).
33. Consultations regarding marine fish and mammals are held with the National Marine
Fisheries Service.
34. § 1536(a)(2).
35. Courts have broadly construed the questionof whetheranactionis an "agency action"
triggering section 7 requirements. See Connor v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441,1453 (9th Cir. 1988).
Such actions may include federal permits, see, e.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758
F.2d 508 (loth Cir. 1985), and land management plans, see, e.g., Pacific Rivers Council v.
Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050,1051-55 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the action must be one over which a
federal agency has discretion and control. See generally Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502,
1508-09 (9th Cir. 1995).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1).
37. § 1536(b).
38. Id.
39. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
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Department of Interior's regulations implementing the ESA define
the Section 7 consultation requirement to apply to "all actions in which
there is discretionary Federal involvement or control."' The discretionary
qualifier was acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Babbitt
when it concluded that, where the action agency lacks the discretion to
influence actions that result in impacts on endangered species,
"consultation would be a meaningless exercise; the agency simply does not
possess the ability to implement measures that inure to the benefit of the
protected species."" In that case, the proposed private action was the
construction design of a logging road through public forest land by a
private party under a right-of-way agreement with the Bureau of Land
Management, which construction might have adversely affected the
endangered spotted owl, thus triggering Section 7 consultation.42
In the Middle Rio Grande, a key issue is whether the BOR has the
discretion to reallocate contracted federal project water for the benefit of an
endangered fish. If it does, then the BOR must consult with the FWS under
Section 7 of the ESA. If the FWS issues a Biological Opinion that concludes
that the existing release schedule for delivery of San Juan-Chama water to
the contractors jeopardizes the continued existence of the silvery minnow,
then the FWS must also suggest Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives
(RPAs) to avoid jeopardy. The RPAs may include reallocation of contracted
San Juan-Chama water for the purpose of avoiding jeopardy to the silvery
minnow.
2. The Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
The Rio Grande silvery minnow is a small fish that occurs only in
the Middle Rio Grande, and currently occupies only about five percent of
its known historic range.43 The FWS listed the minnow as endangered in
1994, noting that the threats to the 'species included "dewatering,
channelization, and regulation of river flow to provide water for irrigation;
diminished water quality caused by municipal, industrial and agricultural
discharges; and competition or predation by introduced, non-native fish
species."
The BOR has entered into several consultations with the FWS
pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA regarding the impact of various BOR
40. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2000).
41. 65 F.3d 1502,1508-09 (9th Cir. 1995).
42. Id. at 1505-06.
43. Final Rule to List the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow as an Endangered Species, 59 Fed.
Reg. 36988 (July 20,1994) (codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 17 (2000)).
44. Id.
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operations on the silvery minnow in the Middle Rio Grande.' The BOR and
the Corps of Engineers prepared a joint Programmatic Biological
Assessment for various water supply operations and flood control
maintenance activities in May 1998 and initiated Section 7 consultation with
the FWS. Thereafter, the FWS prepared a "Draft Biological Opinion and
Conference Report" that concluded that the government's water supply and
flood control activities were likely to jeopardize the Rio Grande silvery
minnow and result in destruction and adverse modification of its proposed
critical habitat." The BOR and the Corps then prepared a second
Programmatic Biological Assessment and again initiated formal Section 7
consultation with the FWS.47 This second assessment refocused the
consultation on what the federal agencies identified as their "discretionary
actions." The BOR asserted that its discretion is limited with respect to
releasing water from Heron Reservoir to supply its contractors:
The Secretary's discretion is limited by Reclamation's
obligation to meet water orders from users in accordance
with contract obligations. In meeting these obligations, the
Secretary exercises discretion in how water is stored in
system reservoirs and released through federal facilities, but
that discretion is narrowed by the contract requirements and
delivery schedules.49
The BOR argued that its discretion is limited by the narrow
statutory purposes provided by reclamation law and authorizing statutes:
Under general principles of Reclamation law, water can only
be stored and released from Reclamation reservoirs for valid
beneficial uses, and consequently must be released at a time
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (1994). Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act requires federal
agencies to consult with the FWS if a proposed agency action may affect an endangered species.
For a summary of BOR's Section 7 coordination activities, see Memorandum in Support of
Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Dismissal at
6-9, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez (D.N.M. filed Nov. 15,1999) (No. CIV 99-01320).
46. See Regional Director of the Fish & Wildlife Service, Draft Biological Opinion and
Conference Report on the Effects of the Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Programmatic Biological Assessment: Water Operations and River Maintenance on
the Middle Rio Grande, New Mexico 9 (n.d.) (on file with author). This Draft Biological
Opinion has been characterized by the BOR as a draft internal document, never finalized or
released for public comment. See Memorandum in Support of Federal Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Dismissal at 7, Rio Grande Si/veryMinnow (No.
CIV 99-01320).
47. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation & U.S. Dep't of the Army, Army
Corps of Engineers, Programmatic Biological Assessment of Federal Discretionary Actions
Related to Water Management on the Middle Rio Grande, New Mexico (Oct. 1999).
48. See id. at 13-14.
49. Id. at 14.
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
and in a way to meet water delivery calls. Further limiting
Reclamation's authority is that Congress authorized the
Middle Rio Grande Project for domestic, municipal, and
irrigation purposes only. In meeting these statutorily
authorized purposes, the United States also takes into
consideration other needs on the river, such as recreation,
wildlife, water quality, and species conservation.'e
C. The Middle Rio Grande Lawsuits
The listing of the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, combined with
increasing water demand and reduced runoff during the mid-1990s,
resulted in a flurry of lawsuits filed in Federal District Court in New
Mexico. These suits address key issues that will help determine how
implementation of the Endangered Species Act with respect to limited
water supplies will affect the future of development in the arid West.
1. The Critical Habitat Cases
At the time of listing of the silvery minnow as endangered, the FWS
declined to designate critical habitat for the minnow due to budgetary
constraints and because "there was insufficient information to perform the
required analysis of the impacts of the designation" (primarily an analysis
of the economic effects of the designation on the region)."1 The FWS was
subsequently ordered to designate critical habitat within a statutorily
mandated deadline.' The FWS designated critical habitat for the minnow
in 1999.' The designation included all of the last remaining portion of the
minnow's occupied range, encompassing 163 miles of the mainstem Rio
Grande through the populous and irrigation-rich Middle Rio Grande
Valley. However, this designation was challenged by the MRGCD, the
Office of the New Mexico State Engineer, and a number of environmental
groups on the grounds that the designation was too broad and violated the
Endangered Species Act as well as the National Environmental Policy Act. '
In December 2000, the District Court set aside the critical habitat
50. Id.
51. Final Designation of Critical Habitat for the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 64 Fed. Reg.
36,274,36,276 (July 6,1999) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2000)).
52. Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178,1193 (10th Cir. 1999).
53. Final Designation of Critical Habitat for the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 64 Fed. Reg.
36,274.
54. See Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist. v. Babbitt, No. CIV 99-00870 (D.N.M filed
Aug. 4,1999) [hereinafter MRGCD v. Babbit), consolidated with New Mexico State Engineer v.
Babbitt, No. CIV 99-00872 (D.N.M. filed Aug. 4,1999), and Forest Guardians v. Babbit, No. CIV.
99-01445 (D.N.M. filed Dec. 15,1999).
[Vol. 41
Spring 20011 REALLOCATING FEDERAL PROJECT WATER
designation as arbitrary and capricious and ordered the FWS to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement and propose a new rule designating
critical habitat for the minnow.' The appeal by the FWS of the District
Court's Final Judgment is currently pending.'
2. City of Albuquerque v. United States
The City of Albuquerque filed suit against the BOR in September
1999, seeking a declaratory judgment that "the United States has no
discretion, authority, or duty to utilize the City's contracted San Juan-
Chama water in the Rio Grande system for endangered species purposes
under the federal Endangered Species Act." ' The City also sought a court
order enjoining the BOR from taking action inconsistent with the provisions
of the declaratory relief it sought.'
The City's fears stemmed from statements the BOR made in various
documents and meetings and legal claims by environmental groups that
asserted that the government could and should release San Juan-Chama
water to augment native Rio Grande stream flows in order to support the
minnow." In particular, the City was concerned about statements in the
draft "biological jeopardy opinion," prepared in October 1999 but not
released, that identified releases of San Juan-Chama water as a "Reasonable
and Prudent Alternative necessary to augment natural Rio Grande stream
flows for an endangered species commonly known as the Rio Grande
Silvery Minnow."'° The City also cited statements in a 1999 Department of
Interior Environmental Assessment on the designation of critical habitat
that San Juan-Chama water should be made available to augment river
flows,' and statements in meetings with BOR and Department of Interior
officials to that effect.0 The City also pointed to legal claims made by
55. MRGCD v. Babbit, No. CIV 99-00870, at 2 (D.N.M. Dec. 27, 2000) (Final Judgment
setting aside final rule). Judge Mechem also ordered the FWS to "fully and earnestly
participate in mediation of the case of Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez" (the ESA case,
discussed below) and consolidated the two cases for the purposes of the mediation. Id. at 2-3.
56. See Federal Defendants' Notice of Appeal, Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dit. v.
Norton, (D.N.MvL filed Feb. 23,2001) (Nos. CIV 99-00870, -00872, -01445) [hereinafter MRGCD
v. Norton] (restyled following 2000 Presidential election).
57. Plaintiff City of Albuquerque's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive
Relief at 3, City of Albuquerque v. United States (D.N.M. filed Sept. 1, 1999) (No. CIV 99-
00985).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 10.
60. Id.
61. id.
62. Id. at 11-12.
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
environmental groups that the City said jeopardized its right to utilize its
contracted share of San Juan-Chama water.'
The BOR, the Department of the Interior, and the Corps of
Engineers (collectively, the Federal Defendants) moved to dismiss the City's
case on the grounds that there had been no agency action, and even if there
were an agency action, the City's cause of action was not ripe because the
Section 7 consultation was not complete, and the City lacked standing
because it could not show an actual or concrete injury." The City argued
that it had a reasonable apprehension of harm due to the government's
statements noted above.' The City also asserted that the Section 7 ESA
process was inapplicable to the San Juan-Chama water because the
government lacked discretionary authority over the City's contracted share
of the water." In particular, the City argued that the release of the San Juan-
Chama water is governed by interstate compacts that require the beneficial
consumptive use of the water in New Mexico. ' No assertions were made
on either side with respect to the discretion provided by the terms of the
contract itself in light of the mandate of the ESA.
The court concluded that the government had taken no action to
repudiate the contracts or their terms, that the City had not changed its
position or future planning in reliance on the government's actions or
inactions, and that there was no evidence that the City has not received or
will not receive its contracted share of San Juan-Chama water.' The court
accordingly dismissed the case without prejudice,"
3. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez
Following the release of the BOR's second Biological Assessment
(on the heels of the internal draft of the jeopardy Biological Opinion), a
number of environmental groups filed suit in Federal District Court on
63. Id. at 10-11.
64. Memorandum in Support of the United States' Motion to Dismiss at 1 (No. CIV 99-
00985).
65. See Plaintiff City of Albuquerque's Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss at 19 (No. CIV 99-00985).
66. Id. at 9-10.
67. Id. at 10. The two compacts at issue are the Colorado River Compact, ch. 42, 45 Stat.
1057 (1928) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1994)), and the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact, art. I, ch. 48,63 Stat. 31 (1949) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 620D (1994)). The City
argued that instream flow for the benefit of the minnow is not a beneficial use as recognized
by New Mexico state law, nor would instream flow be consumptive within New Mexico.
Plaintiff City of Albuquerque's Response in Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss at 10-11, City of Albuquerque (No. CIV 99-00985). See also supra note 3; supra note 23.
68. City ofAlbuquerque, No. CIV 99-00985, at 5 (D.N.M. filed June 22,2000) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order dismissing case).
69. Id.
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behalf of the minnow in November 1999. The plaintiff environmental
groups sought declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged violations of
ESA by the BOR's and Corps' "failing to complete consultation.. .over the
full range of present and future Middle Rio Grande water operations."" The
plaintiff environmental groups asserted that this failure was particularly
serious because "current management actions by the Defendants are
jeopardizing the continued survival of the listed species and are adversely
modifying the species' critical habitat; and Defendants have further failed
to use their authorities to undertake the actions necessary to conserve the
endangered species under the ESA, such as providing necessary water for
Middle Rio Grande flows essential to the health and survival of the silvery
minnow. "71
The plaintiff environmental groups moved for summary judgment
in January 2000 on their claim that the BOR and the Corps failed to consult
with the FWS regarding the full range of water operations and river
management actions,'including the BOR's water deliveries to contractors. 2
The environmental groups cited a line of Ninth Circuit case law to support
their assertion that the contract language as well as the mandate of the ESA
indicate that the government has the discretion to reallocate contracted
water for endangered species purposes, and is therefore compelled to
consult under Section 7 of the ESA regarding such operations." In
particular, the plaintiffs pointed to the "shortage" clause of the City's
contract, which provides,
On account of drouth or other causes, there may occur at
times during any year a shortage in the quantity of water
available from the reservoir storage complex for use by the
City pursuant to this contract. In no event shall any liability
accrue against the United States or any of its officers or
70. Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Rio Grande Silvery
Minnow v. Martinez (D.N.M. filed Nov. 15, 1999) (No. CIV 99-01320). The Complaint also
alleges violations of the National Environmental Policy Act. The Plaintiffs included Defenders
of Wildlife, Forest Guardians, New Mexico Audubon Council, National Audubon Society,
Sierra Club, and Southwest Environmental Center, on behalf of the Rio Grande Silvery
Minnow. Id. at 4-6.
71. /d. at 3.
72. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
1-2 (No. CIV 99-01320). The court stayed the deadline for Response and Reply Briefs, pending
the on-going court-ordered mediation in the case. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, No. CIV 99-01320
(D.N.M. Sept. 12, 2000) (order granting stay).
73. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
26-29 (No. CIV 99-01320). See also Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
at 32. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit case law.
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employees for any damage, direct or indirect, arising out of
any such shortage.74
This is the same language construed by the Ninth Circuit to allow
reallocation of contracted water for endangered species purposes. 5
The plaintiff environmental groups raised the same issues in their
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and accompanying Memorandum in
April 2000. Plaintiffs' stated intent was "to prevent imminent harm to the
endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow from Defendants' river operations
and water deliveries on the Middle Rio Grande" during the year 2000.6 The
motion requested the court to order the BOR and Corps to
manage federal water deliveries, federal reservoirs, other
federal facilities so as to maintain flows in the Middle Rio
Grande which are sufficient (1) to prevent discontinuous
flows or river drying, particularly in the critical river reach
below San Acacia Diversion Dam; and (2) to facilitate silvery
minnow spawning this year..
The plaintiffs' call for continuous flows in the river sparked strong
responses from the federal defendants, joined by the City, the MRGCD and
the State of New Mexico.' The government and the City argued the issue
of governmental discretion under the contracts. 9 The City first asserted that
the government had no discretion over release of San Juan-Chama water to
its contractors because release for the minnow would not be for "beneficial
consumptive use," that such reallocation would violate the Colorado River
Compact and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, and therefore the
BOR and Corps had no obligation to enter into Section 7 consultation with
the FWS regarding release of San Juan-Chama water."
74. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 27,
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (No. CIV 99-01320). See also City Contract, supra note 11, art. 18b.
75. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,683 (9th Cir. 1995).
76. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow (No. CIV 99-01320).
77. Id.at 2
78. See Federal Defendants' Motion and Memorandum to Strike Plaintiffs' April 11, 2000
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and April 11, 2000 Memorandum in Support (CIV 99-01320);
Defendant-Intervenor Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District's Response to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Response of the State of New Mexico to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Injunction; The City of Albuquerque's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed April 11, 2000.
79. See The City of Albuquerque's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction filed April 11, 2000 at 12-16 (CIV 99-01320). Seealso Federal Defendants'
Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 33-36 (CIV 99-
01320).
80. See The City of Albuquerque's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction filed April 11, 2000 at 12,14 (CIV 99-01320).
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The City also addressed the issue of the contract's "shortage" clause
raised by the plaintiff environmental groups. The City first asserted that the
shortage clause in their contract addresses only liability for shortages, but
does not allow the BOR to underdeliver contracted water.81 The City then
argued that the option of declaring a shortage for fish and wildlife purposes
is not available in this case due to the overriding requirements of the
interstate compacts for "beneficial, consumptive use" only. The City
concluded its discretion argument with the assertion that the intended
shortage was a physical, not a regulatory, shortage, a shortage of supply in
the Colorado system, but not of demand in the Rio Grande system.'
The government also addressed the shortage clause, examining the
language in the MRGCD contract similar to the language in the City's
contract." The government argued that this provision's sole purpose is to
shield the government from liability for damages, and in any event, the
BOR does not have unilateral ownership of the water stored in its reservoirs
and has no general authority to shift around that contracted water.5
The contractual discretion issue and its supporting arguments and
counter-arguments have not been ruled upon by the court in the Rio Grande
Silvery Minnow case. An Agreed Order was entered on August 2, 2000,
withdrawing the plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction because the
parties agreed to engage in court-supervised mediation.8 In addition, the
parties came to a detailed agreement, stipulated in the court's Order, to
implement various measures to ensure the minnow's survival through the
year 2000 low-flow season. The agreed measures included close monitoring
of the minnows and river levels, and use of "supplemental water" to
provide continuous flows during the late summer and fall low-flow
months. 7 In particular, the City and the MRGCD agreed to provide 65,000
acre-feet and 20,900 acre-feet, respectively, of their San Juan-Chama water
for "beneficial consumptive use" for irrigation in exchange for native Rio
Grande flows for the benefit of the minnow." In October 2000, additional
water was needed and another similar exchange of the City's San Juan-
81. Id. at 15.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 16.
84. See MRGCD Contract, supra note 11,art. 12b. See also City Contract, supra note 11, art
18b.
85. Federal Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 35, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (CIV 99-01320).
86. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, No. CIV 99-01320, at 11 (D.N.M. Aug. 2,2000) (Agreed
Order Resolving Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction).
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 3-4.
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Chama water for native Rio Grande flows was agreed to in a Supplement
to the Agreed Order."
With these exchanges on paper reflected in modifications to the
schedule of releases from upstream reservoirs (if not in actual water
molecules), the minnow survived through the 2000 low-flow season and the
parties to the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow lawsuit dodged the bullet of a
judicial ruling on the merits, including the contractual discretion issue. If
the ongoing court-ordered mediation succeeded in producing a long-term
solution, such a ruling may have been avoided completely. However, since
water allocation in the Middle Rio Grande is a zero-sum game, a long-term
solution will necessarily mean that some party or parties will have to give
up some of their allocation.' Not surprisingly the court-ordered mediation
has been unsuccessful. On March 27, 2001, the parties filed a Joint Motion
requesting that all stays be lifted and that court ordered mediation
terminate. Given the high value placed on this water and contract rights to
it, a judicial resolution now seems inevitable'
In a line of cases from the Central Valley of California that
examined the contractual discretion issue in the context of BOR water
supply contracts, the Ninth Circuit looked to the terms of the contracts
themselves as well as the amendatory power of the ESA. Accordingly, this
article now turns to the terms of the San Juan-Chama contracts themselves
and the issues they present regarding government discretion to reallocate
water for the silvery minnow.
Il. THE SAN JUAN-CHAMA REPAYMENT CONTRACTS
A. Authorization of the Contracts
The MRGCD and the City both entered into repayment contracts
with the BOR on June 25,1963, "pursuant to the Federal Reclamation Laws,
including particularly the Act of June 13, 1962 (76 Stat. 96), and the Act of
April 11, 1956 (70 Stat. 105), all as amended or supplemented.' 2 The Act of
April 11, 1956, is the Colorado River Storage Project Act, which authorized
investigations and planning for the San Juan-Chama Project. The Act of
89. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, No. CIV 99-01320, at 1-2 (D.N.M. Oct. 5, 2000)
(Supplement to Agreed Order Resolving Plaintif' Motion for Preliminary Injunction).
90. For an interesting perspective on this issue, see Maria O'Brien, Shortage and Tension on
the Upper Rio Grande: Protecting Endangered Species During Times of Drought, Comments from the
Perspective of the Middle Rio Grande Conserincy District, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 145 (1999).
91. See Joseph L Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment
of Contemporary History, 88 CALiF. L REV. 2375, 2390-94 (2000), for Professor Sax's discussion
of this situation and alternative models for resolution.
92. MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, pmbL; City Contract, supra note 11, pmbL
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June 13, 1962, is the San Juan-Chama Project Act, which authorized the
construction and operation of the initial stage of the project. "Federal
Reclamation Law" is defined as the 1902 Federal Reclamation Act "and all
acts amendatory or supplementary thereto."' 3 The use of the San Juan-
Chama water is governed by statutes and interstate compacts, which
specify that project water is for beneficial, consumptive use within New
Mexico."
B. The Terms of the Contracts
This section introduces the discretion issues raised by the language
of the San Juan-Chama repayment contracts. The language of the contracts
is not always crystal clear and often invites conflicting interpretations of
contract terms taken by themselves and in concert with other contract
clauses. The additional question of whether the contracts were further
amended or supplemented by the ESA will be addressed in a later section.
The terms of the City's and the MRGCD's contracts for San Juan-Chama
water that are relevant to the discretion issue addressed in this article are
virtually identical. Contract articles addressing repayment terms, fish and
wildlife allocations, water shortages, allocation of project water supplies,
and the contractors water rights in general are discussed below. 5
1. Repayment Terms
The contractors'9 agreed to pay, in 50 annual installments, that
share of construction costs allocated to their particular water supply
purpose: for the City, the municipal water supply; for the MRGCD,
irrigation. 7 The government retained the responsibility for construction,
operation, and maintenance of project facilities." The contractors also
agreed to pay their percent share of the annual costs of operations and
maintenance of the water supply facilities. Each contractor's percent share
of these annual expenses is based upon the percent share of project water
93. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 1b; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. lb.
94. See supra note 3.
95. Forabroader discussion of BOR contracts and policy implications, see Duane Mecham
& Benjamin M. Simon, Forging a New Federal Reclamation Water Pricing Policy: Legal and Policy
Considerations, 27 ARiz. ST. LJ. 507 (1995).
96. As noted above, the BOR entered into repayment contracts with several Middle Rio
Grande entities. The City and the MRGCD are the two largest contractors in terms of water
apportionment, and therefore have the most to lose if San Juan-Chama water is reallocated for
endangered species purposes. For this reason, it is the terms of these two entities' contracts that
are examined in this section of the article.
97. City Contract, supra note 11, arts. 3,4,6; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 4.
98. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 7a; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 7a.
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allotted to its particular water supply purpose: again, municipal supply for
the City and irrigation supply for the MRGCD."
2. Cost Allocation for the Fish and Wildlife Function
Article 7b of the contracts estimates that 5.6 percent of annual
operation and maintenance costs will be attributable to the "fish and
wildlife function.""° Under this article, the contractors are "not obligated
to pay that portion of the annual operation and maintenance costs allocated
to the fish and wildlife function." 1 Importantly, this "fish and wildlife"
clause further states that "[if unusual circumstances arise which throw the
allocation out of balance, an appropriate modification in the percentage
figure will be made by the Contracting Officer." 2 This language certainly
implies that adjustments in the operation of the project for fish and wildlife
functions were contemplated by all parties to the contract, and that they all
agreed to leave the modification of operations for that function in the hands
of the Contracting Officer, i.e., the government. However, it also implies
that the contractors did not assume the risk of paying for any reallocations
to fish and wildlife purposes. In addition, although the "fish and wildlife
function" intended to be served by this article is undefined by the contracts,
the language is broad enough to include endangered species conservation
as well as recreational fishing.
3. Water Shortages
The San Juan-Chama contracts state,
On account of drouth or other causes, there may occur at
times during any year a shortage in the quantity of water
available from the reservoir storage complex for use by the
[contractors] pursuant to this contract. In no event shall any
liability accrue against the United States or any of its officers
or employees for any damage, direct or indirect, arising out
of any such shortage.
10 3
The plaintiff environmental groups in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow
argued that the text of this contract term means that the goverunent has the
power to reallocate water due to "other causes," including the mandate of
99. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 7a; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 7a. Article
7a of the City Contract allots to the City for municipal supply 52.27% (later amended to
47.35%) of the "total water supply available from the project in any year for all purposes."
Article 7a of the MRGCD Contract allots to the MRGCD for irrigation supply 20.55% of the
"total water supply available from the project in any year for all purposes."
100. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b.
101. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b.
102. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b.
103. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 18b; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 12b.
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the ESA to conserve endangered species dependent on river flows.'" The
City and the federal defendants counter-argued that this clause simply
shields the government from liability for damages in the event of a supply
shortage, and in any case, under the governing interstate compacts, San
Juan-Chama water cannot be allocated to instream flows that are not a
"beneficial, consumptive use.""05 The application of Ninth Circuit case law
to this contract language is further addressed below.
4. Contractors' Water Rights
The contracts specify that each contractor "shall have the exclusive
right to use and dispose of that share of the project water supply available
and allocated to [municipal/irrigation] purposes subject to payment on a
current basis of such charges as are provided for in this contract."'" Further,
the contracts provide that, upon completion of payment for construction
costs, each contractor "shall have a permanent right to the use of that
portion of the project water supply allocated to its use herein." 7 This
language implies that the contractor allotment percentages are fixed, based
upon the allocations of project water to each water supply purpose, and can
only be adjusted if the government retained the authority to adjust the
project water supply "available and allocated" to each water supply
purpose. This issue is discussed further below.
5. The "Other Uses" Clause
The contracts state,
The project is authorized for furnishing water for irrigation
and municipal uses and providing recreation and fish and
wildlife benefits, and for other beneficial purposes. The
supply to be available for [contractors] and the costs payable
by the [contractors for a municipal/irrigation water supply]
reflect apportionment among these purposes and regulation
of releases.es
This language can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that the
contractors agreed to be subject to reductions in their apportionment of
water due to other uses such as fish and wildlife purposes, at the discretion
104. Plaintiffs'MemoranduminSupportofMotionforPartialSummaryJudgmentat 26-27,
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (No. CIV 99-01320); Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 32.
105. City of Albuquerque's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 12-16, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (No. CIV 99-01320); Federal Defendants'
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 33-36.
106. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 18d; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 12d.
107. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 18d; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 12d.
108. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 18h; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 12h.
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of the government that retained the power to determine the supply to be
"available" to the contractors. The alternative interpretation is that the
government took fish and wildlife purposes into account in its original
allotment of 52.27 percent to municipal supply and 20.55 percent to
irrigation supply of the water that comes through the project facilities each
year. The key to this issue is whether the government retained the power
to decide what water is "available" to contractors-is it the entirety of the
water that physically passes through the project facilities or is it the "actual
available" minus some amount for "other uses"? Read by itself, it is unlikely
that the parties to the contract interpreted the language of this article to give
the government such discretion. However, taken together with the
language in the "shortage" provision, the possibility of reallocation due to
"other causes" and "other uses" appears to be more reasonable. The issue
of what power the government retained is discussed further below.
6. Use and Allotment of Project Water
The contracts allocate shortages and excesses in available water
according to the contractors' percentage shares. The contracts state that the
project is designed to furnish an estimated firm yield of approximately
101,800 acre-feet annually."° Of that estimated firm yield amount, the
contractors are allocated their percentage share. For example, MRGCD's
percentage share for irrigation purposes is 20.55 percent of the estimated
project firm yield. The MRGCD contract accordingly applies this percentage
to the estimated firm yield of the project to determine the amount available
to the MRGCD: "20,900 acre-feet shall be available annually to the District
for use as an irrigation water supply.""0 However, this article also
addresses reductions in allocations
[dluring periods of scarcity when the actual available water
supply may be less than the estimated firm yield, the
[contractor] shall share in the available water supply in the
ratio that allocations above bear to the estimated firm
yield... .During periods of abundance when the actual
available water supply may be more than the estimated firm
yield, the [contractor] shall have the right to a share in the
actual available water supply in the ratio that allocations
above bear to the estimated firm yield, all as determined by
the Contracting Officer."'
This language implies that if discretionary reallocations for
endangered species purposes are valid assertions of governmental power,
109. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 18j; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 12i.
110. MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 12i.
111. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 18j; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 12.
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then the government must still reallocate the amount each contractor
actually receives according to the contractors' specified percentage shares.
This suggests that to accommodate the river flow needs of the silvery
minnow, the amount of project water "available" for distribution to
contractors must be reduced by that amount that will reasonably
accommodate the minnow, like shrinking the pie before the pie is cut in
pieces. The contrasting approach of cutting the pie into smaller pieces by
shrinking each contractors' percentage share of project water to provide
river flows for the minnow appears to violate the plain language and intent
of the contracts in establishing fixed percentage shares for each contractor.
In any case, this clause of the contract clearly and unmistakably leaves the
decision regarding the actual available water (i.e., the size of the pie) in any
year to the government.
However, the "fish and wildlife function" clause also dearly states
that in unusual circumstances modifications to percentage allocations will
be made."2 An endangered fish on the verge of extinction may well be
considered an "unusual circumstance" triggering percentage allocation
modifications under this contract clause. While the "fish and wildlife
function" clause relates primarily to cost allocation, it could be construed
to relate to supply allocation as well, because both are tied to the same
percentage figure derived from supply allocation. In any case, this contract
clause clearly leaves the decision regarding percentage modifications (i.e.,
the size of the pieces of pie) in unusual circumstances regarding fish and
wildlife purposes to the government.
In sum, the terms of the repayment contracts, taken together,
suggest there is some government discretion to reallocate water for
endangered species. However, the path through the contract language to
arrive at this conclusion is tangled, and must be balanced against the
contracts' clear commitment to allocate specified percentage shares of
available project water to municipal and irrigation users. The power of the
government to reallocate water under the contracts becomes clearer if the
ESA is held to amend the contracts, thus inserting its overriding mandate
to conserve endangered species into the contracts themselves. Accordingly,
the article now turns to examining the Ninth Circuit case law that
concluded that the ESA does amend such contracts.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION APPLIED TO THE
SAN JUAN-CHAMA CONTRACTS
The Central Valley of California spawned a number'of lawsuits
through the 1990s that mirror the issues raised in the lawsuits pending
112. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b.
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today in the Middle Rio Grande. Irrigators in the Central Valley that had
water supply contracts with the BOR found their irrigation supplies
reallocated to serve the needs of endangered fish. In a decade-long line of
cases arising from these conflicts, the Ninth Circuit held that the
government had the right to impose policy requirements of a subsequent
act, such as the Endangered Species Act, in a variety of situations involving
BOR water supply contracts. In particular, the court held that subsequently
enacted statutes such as the Endangered Species Act allowed for
government amendment of water supply contracts in situations where the
property rights of the contractor were implied at best,' where the
government altered contract terms when renewing a contract"4 or
withdrawing a contract,"5 where a water supply contract included a
"shortage" clause identical to those in the San Juan-Chama contracts, ' and
where a federal agency such as the BOR retained some measure of control
over the water supply activity.""
There are several ways in which the Ninth Circuit holdings can be
applied to the question of the government's discretion to reallocate San
Juan-Chama water for endangered species purposes in the Middle Rio
Grande. First, it can be argued, as the plaintiff environmental groups did in
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez, that the "shortage" clause in the San
Juan-Chama contracts provides the BOR discretion to reallocate water for
113. See Petersonv. United States Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (gthCir. 1990) (holding that
the government could impose the policy requirements of a subsequent act on a prior contract
where the water supply rights of the plaintiff were only implied).
114. See Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir 1993) (holding that the
government retained the right to alter the terms of a water supply contract when renewing that
contract because the government had not surrendered in unmistakable terms its power to
impose the mandates of subsequent environmental laws on the contract).
115. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter
NRDC v. Houstoni (holding that renewals of water delivery contracts are agency actions under
the ESA triggering Section 7 requirements).
116. See ONeill v. United States, 50 F3 677 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a shortage clause
in a water supply contract unambiguously relieved the government from liability due to
shortage, drought or any other cause, and even if the contract did obligate the government to
supply a specified amount of water without exception, the contract was not immune from
subsequently enacted statutes to protect endangered fish).
117. See Klamath Water Users Protective Assn v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that contractors' rights to water are subservient to the ESA, and even where the Act
was passed long after the contract, the statute still applies as long as the federal agency retains
some measure of control over the activity, in this case, title to and operation of the dam), cert,
denied sub nor. Klamath Drainage Dist v. Patterson, 121 S. Ct. 44 (2000), amended by 203 F.3d
1175 (9th Cir. 2000).
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an endangered species, 18 applying the Ninth Circuit holding in O'Neill v.
United States.'1" The second argument is that the BOR has discretion to
reduce the project water "available" to the contractors, as held in O'Neill
and Natural Resources Defense Council [NRDC] v. Houston.2" Third, minnow
advocates could argue that the ESA amends and supplements federal
reclamation law and contracts, thereby incorporating into the contracts the
ESA's overriding mandate to conserve endangered species, as the Ninth
Circuit concluded in O'Neill, NRDC, and Klamath Water Users Protective
Association v. Patterson.12' These three arguments are examined further
below, with particular attention on how these issues have been framed in
the Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez case.
A. Using the Shortage Clause Together with the Fish and Wildlife
Function Clause
The plaintiff environmental groups in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v.
Martinez pointed to the Ninth Circuit's decision in O'Neill v. United States to
support their assertion that the "shortage" clause in the San Juan-Chama
contracts provides the BOR the discretion to reallocate water for
endangered species." In O'Neill, the BOR reallocated federal project water
for the benefit of two listed fish species under the authority of the Central
Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA),' enacted for the benefit of the
fish following the release of two jeopardy Biological Opinions, thereby
shorting downstream irrigators who had water supply contracts with the
BOR."4 The court examined the language of the water contracts between the
118. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
26, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (No. CIV 99-01320); Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 32.
119. 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995). For a summary of this case, see Lisa L Nguyen, O'Neill v.
United States: Endangered Species Act and Central Valley Project Improvement Act Can Invoke
Contract Clause that Limits Liability Due to Water Shortages, 16 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES &
ENvrTv. L 201 (1996). See also Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public
Authority Over Reclamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVrL- L.J. 363,399-401 (1997).
120. 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998).
121. 203 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2000).
122. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 26,
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (No. CIV 99-01320); Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 32.
123. Pub. L. No. 102-575,106Stat. 4706(1992) (notcodified). Thepurposeof theCVPIA was
to dedicate federal project water for fish and wildlife preservation and habitat restoration
purposes.
124. A distinctionbetween the contracts in O'Neill and the SanJuan.-Chama contracts is that
the CVPIA specifically amended the 1937 congressional authorization of the Central Valley
Project (CVP), under which the CVP water supply contracts were made. The CVPIA thus
explicitly inserted into the CVP a strong statement requiring "a reasonable balance among
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Central Valley irrigators and the BOR, particularly the clause that absolved
the government of liability for water shortages due to drought "or any other
cause."' 2 The O'Neill court held that this language "is unambiguous and
that an unavailability of water resulting from the mandates of valid
legislation constitutes a shortage by reason of 'any other causes.""' 6 The
court affirmed the district court's conclusion that "the contract does not
obligate the government to furnish to [a contractor] the full contractual
amount of water when that water cannot be delivered consistently with the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act."2'
The San Juan-Chama contracts contain almost the same language
in their "shortage" clauses." The Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez
plaintiffs asserted that this language gives the BOR the discretion to declare
a shortage by reason of an "other cause" in order to supply water for the
silvery minnow."2 The City responded with three counter-arguments. The
first was that the BOR can declare a shortage only for a drought."3 This
argument is not persuasive because it ignores the "other causes" language.
The City's second counter-argument was that, even if the BOR
could declare a shortage, there is no clause in the contract that allows the
BOR to increase the fish and wildlife share by decreasing the contractors'
shares. 3' This argument does not take into account the "fish and wildlife
function" clause that retains government power to reallocate percentage
costs in the event of "unusual circumstances" regarding the "fish and
wildlife function." 2 This clause may provide support for discretion to
competing demands for use of Central Valley Project water, including the requirements of fish
and wildlife, agricultural, municipal and industrial and power contractors." Pub. L No. 102-
575, 106 Stat. 4706. No such explicit amendment of the San Juan-Chama Project Act has
occurred. However, this distinction should not obviate the application of O'Neill to the San
Juan-Chama contract analysis, as the Ninth Circuit's holding in that case did not depend solely
upon the CVPIA's explicit amendment of the federal project's purpose. Rather, the O'Neill
holding focused on the amendatory mandate of the Endangered Species Act and the text of the
contract's shortage clause, which is almost identical to those articles in the San Juan-Chama
contracts.
125. 50 F.3d at 680.
126. Id. at 684.
127. Id. at 680.
128. See City Contract, supra note 11, art. 18b; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 12b. The
San Juan-Chama contracts include the wording "other causes" rather than "any other causes,"
which may weaken the analogy between the cases.
129. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 27, Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow (No. CIV 99-01320).
130. City's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15
(No. CIV 99-01320).
131. Id. at 14-15.
132. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 7b.
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reallocate supplies as well as costs because costs are based on supply
percentages."
The City's third counter-argument was that the intended shortage
to which this clause applies is a physical or climatic shortage in supply, not
a regulatory shortage or increase in demand.M However, this argument is
not persuasive in the context of the Ninth Circuit's broad reading of the
"other causes" language."
B. Redefining Available Project Water
The Ninth Circuit provided another discretion argument in O'Neill
and NRDC v. Houston. As noted above, the O'Neill court concluded that the
language of the "shortage" clause was unambiguous and that "an
unavailability of water resulting from the mandates of valid legislation
constitutes a shortage by reason of 'any other causes."'"- Thus, under the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the needs of an endangered species reduce the
water supply legally "available" to the contractors.
The Ninth Circuit applied this same reasoning in NRDC v.
Houston." In that case, the intervening irrigators argued that an Opinion of
the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, which concluded that the
BOR had no discretion to reallocate contracted water, was entitled to
deference." The court responded that the Solicitor "assumed that the
'project's available water supply' included all of the [federal project] water,
and he did not address the issue of whether the total amount of available
project water could be reduced in order to comply with the ESA or state
law."' " The court concluded that the BOR "may be able to reduce the
amount of water available for sale [to contractors] if necessary to comply
with ESA." 140
This holding supports redefinition of what water is available to
contractors under the "use and allotment" and "other uses" contract
clauses. 4' Those clauses specify that it is "available water" that is allocated
133. See supra Part M.B.1.
134. City's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 16,
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (No. CW 99-01320).
135. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,683 (9th Cir. 1995).
136. Id.
137. 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Nathan Baker, Water, Water, Everywhere, and At
Last a Drop for Salmon? NRDC v. Houston Heralds New Prospects under Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act, 29 ENvrL. L 607 (1999).
138. 146 F.3d at 1126.
139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. See City Contract, supra note 11, arts. 18h, 18j; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, arts.
12h, 12i.
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to the contractors according to their percentage shares. According to the text
of the contracts, "available water" may be affected by droughts, surpluses,
and other causes. Under this analysis, "available water" is not what is
physically available through the project works, but what is legally available,
taking into consideration both physical availability and the legal mandates
of the Endangered Species Act.
Thus, the text of the contracts themselves, taken together, provides
a fairly strong basis for the conclusion that the contracting parties agreed to
the government's retention of discretion to reallocate in the event of
shortage, drought, or other causes. 42 If the BOR has the discretion under the
contracts to reduce the amount of water that is available to contractors for
other causes, such as the need to conserve endangered species, then it must
enter Section 7 consultation on those matters and may reallocate water
without breaching the contracts.
C. ESA Amends Reclamation Law
Even if the terms of the contracts themselves do not provide the
discretion to reallocate contracted water for endangered species, the O'Neill
court noted that such discretion is provided by the Endangered Species Act,
"as the contract is not immune from subsequently enacted statutes."" The
court concluded that the ESA amends and supplements federal reclamation
law and therefore the contracts entered into pursuant to those laws.
Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe'" with respect to the "unmistakable terms" doctrine of government
contract construction, the court stated that
In]othing in the 1963 contract surrenders in "unmistakable
terms" Congress's sovereign power to enact legislation.
Rather, the contract was executed pursuant to the 1902
Reclamation Act and all acts amendatory or supplementary
thereto... .The contract contemplates future changes in
reclamation laws.. .and... limits the government's liability for
shortages due to any causes .... CVPIA marks a shift in
142. However, reading the contract terms together leads to the conclusion that the parties
also intended any such reductions to occur pro rata, according to and preserving the
percentage allocations to each contractor. If the project water "available" to the contractors is
reduced under the ESA, the contractors may still have a successful breach of contract or Fifth
Amendment takings claim if the remaining "available" water is allocated disproportionately
among the contractors.
143, 50 F.3d at 686.
144. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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reclamation law modifying the priority of water uses. There
is nothing in the contract that precludes such a shift."4
The court held that a pre-existing water supply contract "does not obligate
the government to furnish to [an irrigation contractor] the full contractual
amount of water when that water cannot be delivered consistently with the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act.""
This conclusion was echoed in the most recent Ninth Circuit
holding on this issue in Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson.47
In Klamath, irrigators sued the BOR over the operation of the Link River
Dam. A contract between the BOR and the dam operator governed the
management of the dam."e The FWS issued a Biological Opinion in 1992
that specified minimum lake levels behind the dam in order to avoid
jeopardy to two threatened and endangered fish located in and around the
project.149 The irrigators claimed third party beneficiary status regarding the
contract and sued to protect their pre-existing irrigation supply from the
dam. The court concluded that the irrigators were not intended third party
beneficiaries of the contract between the BOR and the dam operator.'50
The irrigators also claimed that the dam operator did not have a
legal duty to operate Link River Dam to meet ESA obligations. 15' However,
the court concluded that the contractors' rights to the federal project water
were subservient to the ESA because "[it is well settled that contractual
arrangements can be altered by subsequent Congressional legislation." "sr
The court noted that the BOR had retained authority to manage the dam
and remained fee simple owner.153 "Even in circumstances where the ESA
was passed well after the agreement, the legislation still applies as long as
the federal agency retains some measure of control over the activity.""
In the case of the San Juan-Chama contracts, the BOR explicitly
retained title to the project facilities's' and control over operations and
maintenance of the project facilities, including releases to contractors."s The
San Juan-Chama contracts were also authorized pursuant to the Federal
145. 50F.3d at 686 (citing 1963 Contractprnbl.;Madera IrrigationDist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d
1397, 1407 (9th Cir. 1993) (Hall, J., concurring)).
146. Id. at 680.
147. 204 F.3d 1206 (9th Ciro 1999), cert. denied sub noa. Klamath Drainage Dist. v. Patterson,
121 S. Ct. 44 (2000), amended by 203 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2000).
148. Id. at 1209.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1212.
151. Id. at 1213.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 12.
156. City Contract, supra note 11, art. 7a; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 7a.
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Reclamation Laws and all acts amendatory or supplementary thereto." 7
These considerations support the argument that the ESA amended and
supplemented the San Juan-Chama contracts just as the Ninth Circuit held
that it amended the Central Valley Project contracts. In that case,
conservation of endangered species became not just an objective, but a goal
to be afforded the highest priority by federal agencies to "halt and reverse
the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.""s
The Federal Defendants in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Martinez
argued that the plaintiffs used the O'Neill holding too broadly, and that
declaring a shortage would not make more water available for the
minnow."' The government noted that the language of the shortage clause
only limits the government's liability for money damages in case of a
shortage, and that the BOR cannot just shift water away from contractors
under this clause." The Ninth Circuit did not agree with this reasoning.
The O'Neill court broadly applied the proposition that the mandates of the
ESA modify the pre-existing contracts so that, under the shortage clause, the
needs of an endangered species render that water "unavailable" to the
contractors.16'
In sum, the text of the San Juan-Chama contracts can be construed
to enable reallocation of project water for endangered species purposes.
Although the terms of the contracts, by themselves, can be construed
together to support the government's reallocation discretion, the argument
is strengthened substantially if the ESA is held to amend the contracts with
its mandate to put species preservation as the highest priority of every
federal agency. However, a recent U.S. Supreme Court case"6 called into
question the use of the "unmistakable terms" doctrine of government
contract construction that underlies this conclusion in O'Neill and other
Ninth Circuit cases. Accordingly, this article now turns to an analysis of the
Winstar decision and its effect on the Ninth Circuit reasoning.
157. City Contract, supra note 11, pmbl; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, pmbl.
158. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
159. Federal Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 35, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow (No. CIV 99-01320).
160. Id. at 35-36.
161. See 50 F.3d at 684.
162. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
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V. The Unmistakable Terms Doctrine and the San Juan-Chama
Contracts
A. The Unmistakable Terms Issue
The O'Neill court held that
[nlothing in the 1963 contract surrenders in 'unmistakable
terms' Congress's sovereign power to enact legislation.
Rather, the contract was executed pursuant to the 1902
Reclamation Act and all acts amendatory or supplementary
thereto... .The contract contemplates future changes in
reclamation laws.. .and...limits the government's liability for
shortages due to any causes... .CVPIA marks a shift in
reclamation law modifying the priority of water uses. There
is nothing in the contract that precludes such a shift.'"
In arriving at this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme
Court for the proposition that "Congress's power to exercise sovereign
authority 'will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable
terms'... [Contractual arrangements, including those to which a sovereign
itself is party, 'remain subject to subsequent legislation' by the sovereign."' "
The Ninth Circuit had applied this reasoning in previous cases regarding
construction of water supply contracts," and reiterated it most recently in
Klamath Water Users Protective Association v. Peterson: "It is well settled that
contractual arrangements can be altered by subsequent Congressional
legislation."'" This doctrine of government contract construction guided the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Endangered Species Act amended and
supplemented the BOR's water supply contracts.
However, a 1996 U.S. Supreme Court case examined the
"unmistakable terms" doctrine as it applies to government contracts and
concluded that its application should be limited.167 If the unmistakable
terms doctrine does not apply to the San Juan-Chama contracts, then the
ESA may be held not to amend federal reclamation law, weakening the
argument for the BOR's discretion to reallocate project water for the silvery
minnow. In that case, minnow advocates would be left with a discretion
argument resting on the terms of the contracts by themselves. If the
163. 50 F.3d at 686 (citing 1963 Contract pnbl.; Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d
1397,1407 (9th Cir. 1993) (Hall, J., concurring)).
164. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52
(1986); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,147-48 (1982)).
165. See, e.g., Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397,1406 (9th Cir. 1993).
166. 204 F.3d 1206,1213 (1999) (citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Klamath Drainage
Dist. v. Patterson, 121 S. Ct. 44 (2000), amended by 203 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2000).
167. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839.
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unmistakable terms doctrine does apply to the San Juan-Chama contracts,
minnow advocates can more easily assert that the ESA amends the
contracts, strengthening the argument that the BOR has discretion to
reallocate project water for the silvery minnow. The Winstar case is the key
to this distinction.
B. United States v. Winstar
In United States v. Winstar, three banks brought suit against the
United States, claiming that the enactment and enforcement of a federal
statute breached prior contracts between the banks and the government."
The banks had entered into contracts with the government for special
accounting treatment that encouraged healthy banks to acquire failing
thrifts during the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. Congress
subsequently passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 169 which limited the application of the
special accounting measures specified in the contracts. Under FIRREA,
some banks were seized and liquidated for failure to comply with the new
statutory limitations. Three banks filed suit, claimingbreach of contract and
seeking damages.
In its defense, the government argued that the contracts had not
surrendered sovereign authority to make regulatory changes in
unmistakable terms.'" The government relied on the unmistakable terms
doctrine as stated in previous Supreme Court decisions: "'Sovereign
power.. .governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction, and
will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.'" 7 However,
a seven-to-two majority of the Supreme Court found for the Winstar
plaintiff banks in a decision that was split into three different opinions and
a dissent.
The principal opinion by Justice Souter examined the unmistakable
terms doctrine and established an effects test that limits the doctrine's
application in future government contract disputes. Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion expands upon the discussion of the doctrine. Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas concurred in the judgment, but not in the
principal opinion's argument. Justices Rhenquist and Ginsburg joined in a
dissent that attacked the limitation of the unmistakable terms doctrine.
168. See id.
169. Pub. L No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
170. 518 U.S. at 871.
171. Id. at 871-72 (quoting Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477
U.S. 41,52 (1986); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
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1. Justice Souter's Principal Opinion
Justice Souter's principal opinion, joined by Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and O'Connor,1 examined the application of the unmistakable
terms doctrine with respect to a contract's effect on sovereign power.'"
Justice Souter framed the collective holding of the key cases 4 that
established the doctrine as
a contract with a sovereign government will not be read to
include an unstated term exempting the other contracting
party from the application of a subsequent sovereign act
(including an Act of Congress), nor will an ambiguous term
of a grant or contract be construed as a conveyance or
surrender of sovereign power.'"
Therefore, Justice Souter concluded that the rule applies "when the
Government is subject either to a claim that its contract has surrendered a
sovereign power (e.g., to tax or control navigation), or to a claim that cannot
be recognized without creating an exemption from the exercise of such a
power (e.g., the equivalent of exemption from Social Security
obligations).' 76
In particular, Justice Souter found that the application of the
unmistakable terms doctrine "turns on whether enforcement of the
contractual obligation alleged would block the exercise of a sovereign
power of the Government."'" An injunction against enforcement of a
subsequently enacted statute would constitute such a blockage of sovereign
power, as would award of damages in situations where such an award
would be the equivalent of an exemption from the terms of a subsequent
statute. In such cases, the unmistakable terms doctrine would apply to
protect sovereign power. Justice Souter particularly pointed to the Bowen
172. Justice O'Connor joined in Part 11 of Justice Souter's Opinion, which addresses the
umistakability doctrine, but did not join in Part IV-A and 1V-B on other issues regarding
application of the sovereign acts doctrine.
173. 518 U.S. at 871.
174. The cases establishing the unmistakable terms doctrine examined by the Winstar
opinions were Merrion, 455 U.S. 130 (holding that a tribe as a sovereign government has
inherent power to impose a severance tax on mining activities), Bowen, 477 U.S. 41 (holding
that section 103 of the Social Security Amendments Act of 1983 was enforceable even though
the amendment abrogated previous agreements between the government and state social
security agencies that allowed states to withdraw social security coverage for the states'
employees), and United States v. Cherokee Nation of kO., 480 U.S. 700 (1987) (holding that a
waiver of federal sovereign power to control navigation will not be inferred from silence in a
government treaty conferring title to a riverbed).
175. 518 U.S. at 878.
176. Id. at 878-79.
177. Id. at 879.
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case, in which "the sole relief sought was dollars and cents, but the award
of damages as requested would have been the equivalent of exemption
from the terms of a subsequent statute." " In that case, granting a claim for
a tax rebate under an agreement for a tax exemption would "block the
exercise of the taxing power, and the unmistakability doctrine would have
to be satisfied.""
At the other end of the spectrum, Justice Souter saw many ordinary
government contracts "say, to buy food for the army; no sovereign power
is limited by the Government's promise to purchase and a claim for
damages implies no such limitation.""0 Justice Souter concluded that these
were "humdrum" contracts that "no one would seriously contend.. .might
be subject to the unmistakability doctrine."18' Justice Souter characterized
these types of contracts as "risk-shifting," to be treated "as the law of
contracts has always treated promises to provide something beyond the
promisor's absolute control, that is, as a promise to insure the promisee
against loss arising from the promised condition's
nonoccurrence .... Contracts like this are especially appropriate in the world
of regulated industries, where the risk that legal change will prevent the
bargained-for performance is always lurking in the shadows.""8 2 Justice
Souter concluded that the unmistakable terms doctrine simply does not
apply to such risk-shifting contracts
[slo long as such a contract is reasonably construed to include
a risk-shifting component that may be enforced without
effectively barring the exercise of [sovereign] power, the
enforcement of the risk allocation raises nothing for the
unmistakability doctrine to guard against, and there is no
reason to apply it."*
In Winstar, the plaintiff banks were not seeking to enforce the
contractual obligation for special accounting measures or to enjoin the
enforcement of FIRREA, but were seeking only money damages. Justice
Souter concluded that the award of dollars and cents in damages would not
prevent the government from exercising its authority under FIRREA, nor
would it be the equivalent of an exemption from the terms of the
subsequent statute.'" Therefore, Justice Souter concluded that these were
178. Id. at 879-80.
179. Id. at 880 (citing Bowen, 477 U.S. at 51).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 868-869 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 880.
184. See id. at 881. Justice Souter was not concerned that such a conclusion may incur larger
costs in regulation arising from increase award of damages: "Just as we have long recognized
that the Constitution 'bar[s] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
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simply "risk-shifting" contracts and since there was "nothing for the
unmistakability doctrine to guard against," it did not apply."
2. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer accentuated the distinction
between an "ordinary" government contract, typically governed by rules
applicable to contracts between private parties, and a government contract
that involves "unique features of sovereignty." ' First, Justice Breyer
acknowledged that the cases establishing the unmistakable terms doctrine
applied it appropriately because they involved unique features of
sovereignty such as the power to tax and control navigation."' Justice
Breyer then concluded that these were unusual cases and that, in contrast,
ordinary principles of contract law, where contracts are construed in terms
of the parties' intent as revealed by language and circumstance, should
apply to ordinary government contracts.'8 Further, Justice Breyer noted
that the inclusion of explicit language reserving the right to amend, as in
Bowen, supports the application of the unmistakable terms doctrine in such
"unusual" cases.' " However, in the Winstar contracts, Justice Breyer found
no amendatory language and nothing in the plaintiffs' damage claim that
implicated a unique feature of sovereignty-the court could award
damages without preventing the government from enforcing FIRREA.'
3. Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, concurred
in the judgment that the government had breached the contracts with the
banks, but did not agree that one can apply to government contracts the
same "intent of the parties" construction that is applied to private contracts:
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,' so we
must reject the suggestion that the Government may simply shift costs of legislation onto its
contractual partners who are adversely affected by the change in the law, when the
Government has assumed the risk of such change." Id. at 883 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted). Justice Souter was, however, concerned about the doctrine's effect on the ability of
the government to enter contracts: "Injecting the opportunity for unmistakability litigationinto
every common contract action would, however, produce the untoward result of compromising
the Government's practical capacity to make contracts, which we have held to be 'of the
essence of sovereignty' itself." Id. at 884 (citation omitted). Justice Rhenquist, in his dissent,
does not take this prospect seriously: "The Government's contracting authority has survived
from the beginning of the Nation with no diminution in bidders, so far as I am aware, without
curtailment of the unmistakability doctrine announced today." Id. at 929.
185. Id. at 880.
186. See id. at 911-14,918.
187. See id. at 914-17. See also supra note 174.
188. See id. at 911.
189. See id. at 916.
190. See id. at 918.
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When the contracting party is the government.. .it is
reasonable to presume (unless the opposite clearly appears) that
the sovereign does not promise that none of its multifarious
sovereign acts, needful for the public good, will incidentally
disable it or the other party from performing one of the
promised acts.'"'
Justice Scalia noted that this proposition is the cornerstone of the
unmistakable terms doctrine:
The requirement of unmistakability embodies this reversal of
the normal reasonable presumption. Governments do not
ordinarily agree to curtail their sovereign or legislative
powers, and contracts must be interpreted in a commonsense
way against that background understanding.
92
Justice Scalia looked to the text of the contracts and found within
their terms an unmistakable promise not to change the regulation of
accounting measures: "Either there was an undertaking to regulate
respondents as agreed for the specified amortization periods, or there was
no promise regarding the future at all-not even so much as a peppercorn's
worth." 93 Since the contracts had made promises to regulate in a certain
fashion, with no mention of the possibility of amendment, Justice Scalia
concluded that no further promise not to change that regulation was
needed to establish that these promises were unmistakable: "While it is true
enough, as the dissent points out, that one who deals with the Government
may need to "'turn square comers,' he need not turn them twice."194
4. Justice Rhenquist's Dissent
Justice Rhenquist, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented in the
judgment and in what he saw as the principal opinion's drastic reduction
in the scope of the unmistakable terms doctrine, "shrouding the residue
with clouds of uncertainty."195 Justice Rhenquist attacked the principal
opinion's distinction, on the basis of effects, between those contracts to
which the unmistakable terms doctrine applies and those to which it does
not. He saw this distinction as artificial, leading to sophisticated lawyers
crafting their claims so as to result in remedies (injunctions or damages) that
obviate the application of the unmistakable terms doctrine, a result that has
191. ld. at 9206921.
192. Id. at 921.
193. Id. at 922.
194. Id. (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 924.
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an "Alice in Wonderland aspect to it, which suggests the distinction upon
which it is based is a fallacious one."196
The Dissent points out that the effects test is a cart-before-the-horse
analysis. The unmistakable terms doctrine is a canon of government
contract construction that is designed to assist in determining liability prior
to the assessment of remedies such as injunctions or damages." Only once
liability is established would the issue of remedies arise. However, the
principal opinion's effects test leapfrogs the issue of remedies into the
assessment of basic liability, and disallows the application of the
unmistakable terms doctrine in assessing liability where the contract is
deemed to be risk-shifting based on the remedy sought. Justice Rhenquist
concludes that this approach "tosses to the winds any idea of the
unnistakability doctrine as a canon of construction; if a canon of
construction cannot come into play until the contract has first been
interpreted as to liability by an appellate court, and remanded for
computation of damages, it is no canon of construction at all."'"
In sum, the fractured Winstar decision leaves us with some
uncertainty regarding the extent and applicability of the unmistakable
terms doctrine in specific situations.1 " A four-memberpluralityof the Court
supported a limitation of the doctrine to situations where the remedy
sought, either injunction or damages, would block the exercise of a
sovereign power. Three members supported application of the doctrine to
the text of government contracts so that, in the absence of explicit terms that
admit the possibility of future statutory amendment, the affirmative
promises made by the government would be construed as unmistakably
surrendering sovereign power consistent with the terms of the contract.
Finally, two members (who are usually ideological opposites) disagree with
the majority and prefer a broad application of the unmistakable terms
doctrine.
C. Winstar Applied to the San Juan-Chama Contracts
Under Justice Souter's effects test, the application of the
unmistakable terms doctrine to a government contract depends on the
remedy sought and its effects on the exercise of sovereign power. A claim
seeking to enjoin the BOR from reallocating water for the silvery minnow
pursuant to the Endangered Species Act would seek to block the exercise
196. Id. at 929.
197. Id. at 929-30.
198. Id. at 930.
199. For a further discussion of the range of possible interpretations and applications, see
Michael W. Graf, The Determination of Property Rights in Public Contracts after Winstar v. United
States: Where Has the Supreme Court Left Us?, 38 NAT. REsouRCESJ. 197 (1998).
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of a sovereign power-the power to fulfill agency obligations under the
Endangered Species Act. According to Justice Souter, this would implicate
something "for the unmistakability doctrine to guard against," and would
warrant the application of the doctrine. This reasoning strengthens the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion that, with the application of the unmistakability
doctrine to the BOR contracts, the mandates of the Endangered Species Act
amend the contracts, and provide discretion, in addition to that provided
by the explicit terms of the contracts, for reallocation of water for
endangered species.
However, a claim for money damages that does not seek to enjoin,
or have the equivalent effect of preventing, reallocation of water for
endangered species purposes does not block any sovereign power, but may
result only in dollars and cents payments to the contractors if government
liability for breach of contract is found. In that case, water reallocation could
still occur and the BOR's obligations under the ESA could still be satisfied
outside the contracts. 0 According to Justice Souter, the increased cost of
regulation arising from such damage awards is not as significant a concern
as is the possibly chilling effect of unfettered application of the
unmistakable terms doctrine to all government contracts. 21 In fact, a
damage award for breach of contract may be more socially and
economically efficient than compliance with the contract, if it is held to
deprive the BOR of discretion to reallocate water for endangered species.
While a monetary figure can be placed on an acre-foot of water for
irrigation or municipal purposes, the value of endangered species is
"incalculable," according to Congress and the Supreme Court. °
Admittedly, Justice Souter's approach applied here does have an
"Alice in Wonderland" quality to it, as Justice Rhenquist remarked in his
Winstar dissent.' It is the effect of the remedy sought, not the terms of the
contract or the intent of the parties, that governs how a government
contract is interpreted and determines whether a breach has occurred.
Justice Breyer's approach of looking to the contract itself to see if it
implicated "unique features of sovereignty" in order to warrant application
of the unmistakable terms doctrine appears more sound. Under Justice
Breyer's reasoning, inclusion in the contract of explicit language regarding
200. This is not to suggest that a court would necessarily find the BOR in breach of the San
Juan-Chama contracts for reallocation of water for endangered species purposes. Based on the
terms of the contracts themselves, a court may reasonably find that the BOR retained
reallocation discretion independent of the Endangered Species Act. See supra Part HLA-B.
201. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 883.
202. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,187-88 (1978).
203, 518 U.S. at 929.
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amendment, as in the Bowen case, is a sufficient hallmark of sovereignty to
warrant the application of the unmistakable terms doctrine.'
In the case of the San Juan-Chama contracts, the contracts
themselves state that they are "pursuant to the Federal Reclamation
Laws,...all as amended or supplemented."' It is this language that the
Ninth Circuit interpreted to mean that the government had not surrendered
its sovereign power to amend the contracts in unmistakable terms, and thus
that the Endangered Species Act amended the contract.'
Under Justice Scalia's textual approach with respect to intent of the
parties, this contractual language would arguably warrant the application
of the unmistakable terms doctrine for either an injunction or damages
claim. While in Winstar, Justice Scalia found only amendatory language by
itself sufficed to warrant the application of the unmistakable terms doctrine,
here the San Juan-Chama contracts include more. Specific terms within the
contracts retain discretion for allocation of water in the hands of the
government in times of shortage, drought or "other causes." ' It is this
language the Ninth Circuit interpreted as providing governmental
discretion within the terms of the contract itself.' Taken together, these
terms would likely satisfy Justice Scalia's textual approach, indicating that
it was the intent of the parties to permit subsequent amendment of the
contracts and to leave final discretion for allocation in certain circumstances
to the government, thus warranting application of the unmistakable terms
doctrine.
In sum, the Winstar decision and the Justices' myriad approaches
to government contract construction described in that case's disparate
opinions generally support the application of the unmistakable terms
doctrine to the San Juan-Chama contracts. Only in the case of a plaintiff
claiming money damages for breach of contract does the possibility arise
that the doctrine would not apply. Even in that case it may not be needed,
as the terms of the contract may be sufficient by themselves to provide
discretion for the government's reallocation of water for endangered species
purposes. Under this analysis, parties to the Middle Rio Grande lawsuits
must take into account the probable conclusion that the San Juan-Chama
contracts, by themselves and in light of the mandates of the ESA, provide
the government sufficient discretion to reallocate project water for the
silvery minnow.
204. See id. at 916.
205. City Contract, supra note 11, at 1; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, at 1.
206. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677,686 (9th Cir. 1995).
207. See City Contract, supra note 11, art. 18b; MRGCD Contract, supra note 11, art. 12b.
208. See O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 683-84.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article set out to address one question embedded within the
issue of government discretion to reallocate federal project water for
endangered species: What authority to reallocate contracted San Juan-
Chama water for the silvery minnow do the terms of the contracts provide
to the Bureau of Reclamation in light of that agency's obligations under the
Endangered Species Act? The shortage, other causes, and fish and wildlife
terms of the repayment contracts themselves provide sufficient authority
for reallocation of project water if endangered species needs are considered
primary rather than incidental project purposes. There are two ways to
reach this conclusion. The first is to limit to recreational fishing uses the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States that fish and
wildlife purposes of the San Juan-Chama Project are incidental purposes.'
The second approach is to conclude that the ESA amended the San Juan-
Chama authorizing statutes and contracts or, put another way, the ESA
mandate to conserve endangered species "whatever the cost"21 overrides
the BOR's conflicting duty to provide project water under the contracts.
This may be enough, by itself, to find sufficient BOR discretion to reallocate
contracted water for the silvery minnow.
The contracts will be considered to be amended by the ESA if the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning is adopted and the unmistakable terms doctrine
is held to apply to the San Juan-Chama contracts. Under Winstar, the
unmistakable terms doctrine will apply if the contractors file suit to enjoin
the government's sovereign power to reallocate water in order to comply
with the ESA. However, if the contractors do not seek to block the
reallocation, but seek only damages for their losses, the unmistakable terms
doctrine, as limited by Winstar, would not apply. But, in order to prevail on
their damage claim, the contractors would have to establish that the terms
of the contracts do not admit the possibility of reallocation for fish and
wildlife or "other causes" in order to prove a breach. They would be left
with a textual argument regarding intent of the parties that would have to
overcome the discretionary and reallocation language of the contract terms
in light of the subsequent ESA mandate to conserve endangered species.211
There may be no way for the contractors to avoid the fact that this
is not just any fish, but an endangered fish, inevitably drawing the
209. 657 F.2d 1126,1139 (10thCir. 1981).
210. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,184 (1978).
211. The contractors may also pursue a Fifth Amendment takings claim. An April 2001
Court of Federal Claims case provides support for this approach. See Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist. v. United States, No. 98-101 L, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 72 (Fed. CL Apr. 30,2001)
(holding that the government's reallocation of contracted federalproject water for endangered
species was a physical taking).
[Vol. 41
Spring 2001] REALLOCATING FEDERAL PROJECT WATER
congressional mandates of the ESA into the interpretation of contract terms
and conflicting agency duties. Some commentors have noted that the power
of the ESA is such that it has the potential to amend interstate compacts that
underlie federal projects in the West.2"2 Others have lamented the failure of
government agencies to utilize the full power of the ESA as it was originally
intended by Congress."' It may have been better in the long run for the
Middle Rio Grande water users to find their own solution within the
context of mediation, rather than to put the ESA's power to the test in
litigation. " However, the parties now appear to be forcing a judicial
resolution. In any event, the decisions made here in the Middle Rio Grande
will bear watching by agencies, water contractors, and environmentalists
alike throughout the water-scarce West.
JOAN E. DRAKE
212. See James S. Lochhead, Interplay between Interstate Compacts and Federal
Environmental Laws, Address Before the American Bar Association Section of Environment,
Energy, and Resources, 7th Section Fall Meeting (October 6-9, 1999) (outline on file with
author). Lochhead noted that the mandates of the ESA are creating "train wrecks in the
makin&" and quoted then Congressman, now Vice President Cheney in his remarks on the
1982 amendments to the ESA: "'ITihe Endangered Species Act has gone beyond its original
purpose and will stop water projects in the WesL It even runs the risk of redoing all of the
interstate compacts governing which state gets what share of available water supplies."' Id. at
1.
213. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L REv. 277 (1993).
214. Other regions have found solutions that appear to be working. See, e.g., Jennie L
Bricker & David E. FUippi, Endangered Species Enforcement and Western Water Law, 30 EN , L
735, 759-64 (2000); Michael R. Moore et aL, Water Allocation in the American West: Endangered
Fish versus Irrigated Agriculture, 36 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 319,339.41 (1996); Joseph Sax, supra, note
91.
